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1. Summary 
 
This paper discusses the impact of European unification on the national systems of social 
security and provides a framework for studying the effects of the current European portability 
and coordination scheme for social security benefits within the European Economic Area. To 
simplify the analysis, it focuses on one of the many aspects of social security related to old 
age – long-term care provision. This branch of social security still lacks attention and a 
systematic approach in some European countries. As a consequence, national (and sub-
national) solutions to long-term care are not fully compatible with each other, which poses a 
variety of challenges to the current systems of long-term care provision: Since in a single 
European market workers and their kin are thought to move as freely as in a national labour 
market, the national social security systems face claims made from abroad. Critics fear that 
European integration and the free movement of labour may undermine the notion of solidarity 
most member states adhere to. The paper to be presented intends to rationalise these fears by 
studying to what extent respective effects of Europeanization may evolve. For this purpose it 
describes the current European portability scheme and offers a framework for analysing 
possible effects of this scheme on the national social security schemes. The analysis 
concentrates on the effects of portability between just three EU member states: Spain, 
Germany and Austria. 
 
2. Introduction: Free movement of labour as a challenge to national social policy 
 
The Single European Market, enacted by the Single European Act of 1987, has always been 
more of a development than a static state. Since it became effective in 1992 it is characterised 
by change. The Common Market is based on the four so called basic freedoms, namely the 
free circulation of goods, persons, services and capital. Part of its dynamic is the interaction 
with other policy areas, such as social policy. Until recently, social policy was less of a 
European and mostly a national responsibility. Each member country of the European Union 
considered social policy to be a national affair. This view has been challenged in many ways 
by the actual development in other areas of a self-reinforcing unification process. As a 
consequence, the national social security systems have not been systematically adjusted to 
deal with the challenges that free movement of persons poses to them. 
 
Long-term care systems in particular have been downright overwhelmed by the mobility of 
households brought about by the common market. If we look at Austria, its national social 
security system until very recently prohibited the export of any claims to the long-term care 
system. A person in need of care that moved to another EU member state had no right to 
receive any payment from the Austrian long-term care programs, even if the very same person 
was eligible for benefits as a permanent resident of Austria. Clearly, the potential loss of 
social security benefits represents a major impediment to the supposedly free movement of 
persons. Therefore it comes to no surprise that the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities ruled in March 2001 that non-portability or non-exportability of claims to the 
Austrian long-term care system infringes art. 19 (1) of regulation 1408/71 (EEC). An earlier 
ruling of the same Court already forced the national pension systems to let pensioners receive 
their social security benefits in any of the European Union member states (see Mager 1999: p. 
223). 
 
These rulings and others alike caught the social security systems vastly unprepared. To date it 
is not clear how to handle requests from abroad and if there should be any changes in national 
regulation to adapt the national social security systems to this new European reality. Besides 
the administrative perspective it is also unclear what effects portable social security claims 
will take on the national social security systems. The biggest concerns are uttered with regard 
to costs: It is feared that portable social security claims will increase the total expenditure of 
the national systems and limit any cost cutting efforts (see Palm, Nickless et al. 2000: p. 3). 
 
In the following sections of this paper we will take a look at the current European portability 
and coordination regime, describing its setup and effects on the national social security 
schemes. The analysis of the macro effects is based upon case studies, concerning intra EEA-
migration between three countries, namely Austria, Germany and Spain. For this purpose 
section 3 describes the setup of the national long-term care systems in the three countries and 
problems which different intra-EEA migrants face when migrating between them. Section 4 
proceeds by describing the current European portability and coordination regime which has 
been enforced in order to facilitate solving any problems related to social security and intra-
EEA migration. A framework for analysing possible effects the European portability and 
coordination regime may have on the national social security schemes is provided in section 
5. 
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3. Differing funding systems and system designs in Germany, Austria and Spain: 
The case of long-term care 
 
Limiting the analysis on long-term care and on three out of the fifteen member countries of 
the European Union – Germany, Spain and Austria – we already get a very good impression 
of problems related to portability of social security claims. Of course, if the analysis would 
take a wider perspective thus accounting for all other elements of the national social security 
system more problems would unfold. 
 
On the administrative side the national long-term care schemes mainly face difficulties when 
it comes to exporting claims because of their diverse designs. The German system has a 
Bismarckian tradition and its long-term care system is organised as a social insurance scheme 
similar to the country’s health care insurance scheme. It is financed by contributions and is 
mandatory for those that fulfil the criteria for the mandatory health insurance. This is the case 
for most employees in Germany. Persons with private health insurance are forced to procure 
private long-term care insurance. The system is not designed to fully cover any costs related 
to long-term care but to relief part of the financial burden. It offers transfers in kind, transfers 
in cash or a mixed benefit package. Benefits are not means-tested but depend on the degree of 
a person’s need of care. Persons in need of care without any claims to the long-term care 
insurance and whose financial means are insufficient to meet their care needs are eligible for 
welfare benefits. (See Igl, Stadelmann 1998; Mager 1999; Schneider 1999; Skuban 2000) 
 
This two-source design is also found under the Austrian long-term care system. Persons who 
are not eligible for claims to the national or state-level long-term care schemes and who lack 
any other financial sources may receive welfare benefits. In contrast to the German system the 
Austrian system is not financed via contributions but simply by taxes. It also offers cash 
transfers and certain transfers in kind depending on the degree of care needed. (See Badelt, 
Österle 2001: p. 121-132; Mager, Manegold 1999; Pfeil 1998; Rubisch, Philipp et al. 2001) 
 
In the Spanish case, we do not even look at an explicit long-term care scheme. Persons in 
need of long-term care may apply for benefits from various sources of the different branches 
of the social security. The social security system as a whole is mainly financed by mandatory 
contributions. A smaller part is financed via taxes. What is very particular about the Spanish 
system is its universal approach. It is not possible to distinguish between the contributions to 
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the different branches of the social security system; there is just a single contribution to the 
system as a whole to be paid by each insured person. Persons in need of long-term care are 
eligible for benefits from pension schemes, welfare schemes, invalidity schemes or other 
schemes designed for certain professions such as military personnel, state employees, etc. 
Depending on the source of funding benefits can be means-tested or not. (See Enderlein 1999; 
Rodriguez Cabrero 1999; Sánchez-Rodas Navarro 1998) 
 
In default of policy co-ordination or harmonisation, these differences between the national 
long-term care systems prompt administrative hurdles and incompatibilities. For further 
exploration of incompatibilities let us depict two hypothetical cases of migration from 
Germany to Spain. For the time being, we will neglect the duration of stay (temporary or 
unlimited stay). The first case considers a person in need of long-term care migrating from 
Germany to Spain. The second case reflects on a healthy working-age person migrating along 
the same route. In both scenarios we come across severe problems due to incompatibilities of 
the national long-term care systems involved. 
 
In the first scenario the migrating person in need of long-term care might move to Spain 
because her or his offspring moves or already lives there. If this person was not insured under 
the German long-term care insurance scheme and had no other financial resources then s/he 
would be eligible to draw welfare benefits in Germany. Under the current regulation such 
purely tax-financed benefits cannot be exported to other European countries (see Enderlein 
1999: p. 403; Schrammel, Winkler 2002: p. 180-181). This is not likely to change as it is 
commonly agreed on in the political arena that portable social welfare claims open doors to 
abuse. In addition, it seems that decision-makers disapprove of exporting social welfare 
claims as “simply not right.” To this add problems of accumulation and control. How to check 
if a beneficiary is actually still in need of support when s/he lives abroad and out of reach for 
the local authorities? (See Bundesfinanzministerium 2000: p. 30) 
 
If the care client moving from Germany to Spain was insured under the German long-term 
care insurance scheme and eligible for benefits from this scheme then s/he would be able to 
chose among transfers in kind and cash transfers or a mixture of both types of transfers. In the 
case of cash transfers the portability should present as little a problem as the portability of 
pensions benefits which has been a practice for quite some years inside the European Union. 
However, if the person preferred to draw transfers in kind – which is a mature deliberation 
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because the monetary value of in-kind benefits exceeds the value of cash transfers – 
portability would not be possible (see Mager 1999: p. 223). In this case the current European 
portability scheme arranges for refunds. The German health insurance has to refund the in-
kind benefits consumed in Spain. Cross-national differences in the price and quality of long-
term care present a problem here. To some extent benefit levels reflect the specific cost of 
care in the country in which a scheme operates. If the person received benefits reflecting the 
cost of care services in the country of origin, prices in the destination country, in our case 
Spain, might be lower or higher. The same can be said about quality standards. 
 
Another problem with portability of long-term care benefits emerges with regard to 
monitoring the adequacy of the home care provided under the cash option. The German long-
term care law mandates regular checks of the status of those beneficiaries who draw cash 
benefits. If the person receives care abroad this of course hampers regular checks (see Mager 
1999: p. 223; Schneider 1999). 
 
If we look at the second case, where a person not yet in need of care moves from Germany to 
Spain, we face different problems. The questions to be answered in this context are (i) 
whether or not this person should be integrated into the social security system in Spain and 
(ii) what happens upon return migration. If the individual might return to his or her home 
country it might make sense to go on paying contributions to the German system. In this case 
the European portability rules for posted workers do apply and the time period of the post 
should not extend 12 months. Otherwise this person will be integrated into the Spanish 
national social security system. If the integration into the Spanish system depends on a 
minimum term of residency in Spain the European portability scheme requires that any 
periods of insurance in Germany should be taken into account. Upon return to the German 
labour market the current regulation in Germany lets the person re-integrate into the long-term 
care system. At this point the individual can not draw benefits from the Spanish health care 
system or any other branch of social security system anymore which may apply in the case of 
long-term care. 
 
Possible designs of portability schemes 
When it comes to designing compatible social security systems schemes it is important to 
consider the general setup of national long-term care systems and existing regimes of 
portability. Incompatibilities between national systems go very much along with the 
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incompatibilities between Beveridge-systems (means-tested or needs-tested, tax-financed) and 
systems with Bismarckian tradition (see Kokot 1999: p. 119-125). With Bismarckian systems 
portability of social security claims seems to be less of a problem. Here claims are based on 
contributions and one could argue that people acquire a right to obtain benefits. The two types 
of social security systems do not only differ in terms of funding or eligibility rules. Apart 
from such per se differences in the institutional framework there are three main questions to 
be answered for a systematic analysis or design of portability schemes. (i) Which rules for 
granting benefits do apply (eligibility criteria, extend of benefits), (ii) to which country are 
contributions paid and (iii) from which country  does a person in need of long-term care 
receive her or his benefits, i.e. which country covers the costs? 
 
By combining the options for answering these questions one obtains a large set of possible 
frameworks for (i) cross-boarder payments made to the social security systems of the 
countries considered and (ii) for the portability of benefits between their social security 
systems. Quite a few of the (potential) outcomes appear counter intuitive and inefficient. To 
draw benefits according to German rules (eligibility criteria, extent of benefits) and to have 
the costs covered by the Spanish system while contributing to the German system is such an 
example. Following the principle of fiscal equivalence would require the country whose rules 
apply to any person moving to or from this country to any other EU country to also bear the 
cost related to these rules. To be precise, this country would have to cover long-term care 
needs of and collect social security taxes or contributions from the person under 
consideration. Similarly, the country that actually provides for long-term care for any person 
moving to or from this country to any other EU country should also receive the social security 
taxes or contributions paid by this individual. 
 
Deviations from this principle cause distortions to the detriment of at least one of the systems 
of social security affected by migration flows and may also impede the free movement of 
labour in the European Union. Countries may end up systematically “overpaying” or 
“underpaying” for individuals joining or leaving their social security systems. Overpaying 
implies that there is a financial drainage of social security systems which again challenges 
solidarity among the tax or contribution paying community. At the same time violating fiscal 
equivalence without any effort to mitigate the impact of such violations through social 
security agreements may systematically discourage individual mobility if mobility is 
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associated with a risk of double tax or contribution burdens and/or a risk of losing claims or 
benefits to the social security system. 
 
As we have seen, portability and coordination schemes can be of different design and entail 
accordingly different effects. The next section details the current European portability scheme 
and illustrates possible effects the scheme may have on the national security systems 
involved. 
 
4. The current European portability and coordination regime 
 
The legal basis 
The current European Economic Area portability and coordination scheme for the area of 
social security has roots which reach back to the early times of the European Economic Area 
(EEA). It is based on regulation 1408/71 (EEA), and here mainly article 19(1), and regulation 
574/72 (EEA). These two regulations were the basis for many rulings by the European Union 
Court of Justice. The rulings and the two regulations form what in this paper is called the 
current European Economic Area portability and coordination scheme for the area of social 
security (European portability scheme). 
 
An example of such rulings is a decision of the European Court Of Justice in March 2001, 
that the non-exportability of claims to the national long-term care scheme in Austria infringes 
article 19 (1) of regulation 1408/71 (EEC). Until March 2001 the Austrian agencies 
responsible for administering the long-term care scheme would turn down any claims made 
from abroad. The European Court Of Justice argued in its ruling that benefits a caree is 
entitled too should be seen as benefits in case of sickness and should therefore be paid to 
carees even if they live in another member state. 
 
This example shows in what way the European Court Of Justice created an actual European 
portability scheme with its rulings. In what follows I will depict this actual European 
portability scheme and describe which areas of social security it covers, to whom it applies 
and what its underlying basic principles are. 
 
There have been efforts, mainly from within the European Commission, to consolidate the 
adjudication into a new regulation in order to foster transparency. This so called SLIM 
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initiative (Simpler Legislation for the Single Market) which started in May 1996 led to a 
proposal on simplifying the coordination of social security schemes, which was adopted by 
the Commission on December 21, 1998 (see Europäische Kommission 1999). These efforts of 
consolidation have been hampered by the national negotiators. The proposal has therefore not 
yet resulted into a new, clearer regulation by the European Council which could replace 
regulations 1408/71 (EEC) and 574/72 (EEC) considering the respective EU Court of Justice 
rulings. It seems as if the EU member countries believe to lose if they implement a more 
transparent regulation and they therefore prefer the status quo. There have been no efforts 
however to analyse the consequences of the portability scheme in order to understand if there 
would be any losers and what measures could be taken to counter steer. Section 5 of this 
paper tries to lay out a few concepts which could clarify possible effects of the current 
European portability scheme. 
 
Setup of the current European portability scheme 
In the following I will describe the basic concepts of the current European portability scheme. 
As it has been explained before it does not stem from clear regulation but is mainly based 
upon rulings by the EU Court of Justice. It is not meant to replace the different national social 
security systems by a single European system but provides for their coordination. 
Harmonization would be moreover a very difficult aim because of very diverse living 
standards and long traditions and acceptance of the national social security systems. This 
means that every member state is free to decide who is to be insured under its legislation, 
which benefits are granted and under what conditions, how benefits are calculated and to what 
extent contributions should be paid. The European portability scheme establishes common 
rules and principles which have to be observed by all national authorities, social security 
institutions, courts and tribunals when applying national laws. These fundamental principles 
(equality of treatment, aggregation of periods, export of benefits, applicability of a single 
legislation and the lex loci laboris principle) will be dealt with more in detail after describing 
shortly to whom they apply and which areas of social security they cover. 
 
The European portability scheme applies not only to EU nationals but to all nationals of the 
European Economic Area (EEA). It particularly applies to employed and self-employed 
persons who are or have been insured under the legislation of a state of the European 
Economic Area as to civil servants1, students2, pensioners and members of family or survivors 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1606/98 of 29 June 1998 (OJ L 209, 25.7.1998) 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the abovementioned persons, regardless of their nationality (see Europäische Kommission - 
Beschäftigung und Soziale Angelegenheiten 1999: p. 9). The portability scheme therefore 
does not apply to nationals of states not belonging to the EEA and persons who are not or are 
no longer covered by a national general social security scheme, and are not or are no longer 
considered as family members of an employed or self-employed person or of a pensioner. 
As mentioned in article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/71 the European portability 
scheme applies to all national legislation on: 
 
sickness and maternity 
benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases 
invalidity benefits 
old-age pensions 
survivors’ benefits 
death grants 
unemployment benefits 
family benefits 
 
The European portability scheme therefore includes most areas of social security, leaving 
aside only: 
 
• Social and medical assistance (benefits which are normally means-tested and not 
linked to one of the categories mentioned above, also welfare benefits) 
• Benefits granted to victims of war or its consequences 
• Benefits under existing early retirement schemes, to which other community 
provisions may apply. 
 
Due to the diverse setups of the national social security systems it may sometimes be difficult 
to determine whether or not a particular benefit is covered by the European portability rules. 
(see Europäische Kommission - Beschäftigung und Soziale Angelegenheiten 1999: p. 12) 
 
Basic principles and rules 
One of the main principles is the applicability of a single legislation. It implies that EEA-
migrants should be only subject to the legislation of just one member state. The lex loci 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 307/99 of 8 February 1999 (OJ L 38, 12.2.1999) 
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laboris principle answers the question which country’s legislation should apply: A person has 
to pay contributions to and is covered by the social security system of the country where s/he 
exercises his or her occupational activity. There is only one exception to this rule: In some 
cases a person may be insured in two member states, when s/he is employed in one member 
state and self-employed in another member state. 
 
A person that takes up a new occupational activity in another member state would also stop 
being insured in the member state of his or her former employment and start being insured in 
the member state of his or her new occupational activity. Where this person resides does not 
matter therefore, which is of particular interest for frontier workers to whom this rule 
evidently also applies. A frontier worker may stay resident in the country where s/he carried 
out his or her former occupational activity and will be insured in the country of his or her new 
occupational activity. 
 
If the period of work abroad does not exceed 12 months, the rules for temporary postings 
abroad will apply. In this case the person sent abroad for a limited time period (not replacing 
another employee whose period of posting has ended) will stay insured in the country of his 
or her original occupational activity. If unforeseen circumstances apply an extension of the 
posting period may be granted. The provisions on postings also apply to self-employed 
persons who temporarily work in another country. Other exceptions apply to mariners, 
workers in international transport, civil servants, armed forces, diplomatic missions or 
consular posts. 
 
In some cases the abovementioned rules are not sufficient and the following will apply: If a 
person works in more than one member state he or she will be insured in the country of 
residence. If the person does not reside in any of the countries of his or her occupational 
activity than he or she will be insured in the country where the employer resides or has its 
office registered. In the case of a self-employed person he or she will be insured in the 
country where s/he carries out most of his or her work. If a person is employed in one country 
and self-employed in another country s/he will be insured in the country of employment and 
in exceptional cases in both countries. (see Europäische Kommission - Beschäftigung und 
Soziale Angelegenheiten 1999: p. 14-20) 
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The three resting principles which form the European portability scheme are equality of 
treatment, aggregation of periods and exportability of claims. Once the lex loci laboris 
principle defines where a person is insured and pays contributions, this person is entitled to 
have the same rights and obligations as nationals of that country. The principle of equality of 
treatment applies not only to forms of direct discrimination but also to indirect discrimination. 
As such could be seen provisions which equally apply to nationals and foreigners but put 
foreigners in a disadvantageous position anyway. Such a situation can be found for example 
when a member state makes an entitlement to a benefit subject to residence in that state for a 
certain length of time. This clearly puts migrant workers in a worse position than nationals of 
this state. 
 
The principle of aggregation of periods is meant to help out in such situations. Whenever an 
entitlement to benefits is linked to certain conditions that have to be fulfilled beforehand, the 
competent institution must take account of periods of insurance, residence or employment 
completed under the legislation of other countries. Another example of the principle of 
aggregation is the case of pensions and migration: If a person has been insured 10 years in 
member state A, 25 years in member state B and 5 years in member state C, each member 
state has to calculate the pension corresponding to the total 40 years of insurance. Member 
state A will then pay 10/40 of what a person would have been entitled to after 40 years of 
insurance in this country and member states B and C will pay 25/40 and 5/40, respectively. If 
each member state has a different pensionable age payment of benefits shall only be 
conducted when the person reaches the relevant pensionable age. This leads to situation in 
which a person already receives his or her pension from one member state while waiting to 
reach the pensionable age of another member state in order to receive his or her corresponding 
pension. 
 
The principle of exportability states that if a person is entitled to benefits covered by article 4 
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/71 and resides in another member state the competent 
institution has to transfer the money to his or her foreign bank account deducting postal and 
bank charges. (see Europäische Kommission - Beschäftigung und Soziale Angelegenheiten 
1999: p. 17-36) 
 
Basic principles and rules concerning long-term care 
The European provisions on sickness and maternity as the provisions on invalidity and 
accidents are all relevant when it comes to portability and coordination between the national 
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systems of long-term care. The European Court of Justice ruled in March 2001, that the non-
exportability of claims to the national long-term care scheme in Austria infringes article 19 
(1) of regulation 14008/71 (EEC). Sickness benefits in cash are always paid according to the 
legislation of the country of insurance which is - as depicted above - usually the country of 
occupational activity. This applies to all relevant categories of persons: frontier workers, 
seasonal workers, posted workers, pensioners and family members. Sickness benefits in kind 
are provided according to the legislation of the country of residence. Several possible 
scenarios are possible here: If a person resides in the country of insurance the person is 
entitled to all benefits the same way nationals of this country are. If the country of residence 
and insurance differ the benefits are provided by the sickness insurance institution of the 
country of residence as if the person would be insured with it. Normally, the sickness 
insurance institution of the country of residence is reimbursed by the sickness insurance 
institution of the country of insurance. In this case the European Commission recommends to 
register with the sickness insurance institution of the country of residence (see Europäische 
Kommission - Beschäftigung und Soziale Angelegenheiten 1999: p. 22). 
 
Since the national schemes for long-term care provisions differ greatly, in some cases a 
person in need of care might be entitled to benefits from accidents or invalidity insurance 
schemes. Cash benefits are normally paid directly by the institution the person is insured with. 
However this institution might agree on having the payments done by the institution in the 
country of residence without any changes in the amount of the relevant benefit. If cash 
benefits are based on average earnings only the earnings paid to the institution of insurance 
will be taken into account. In the calculation of benefits family members living in other 
member states have to be considered as well. Cases where a person is entitled to benefits in 
kind are treated equally to benefits in kind in the case of sickness: If the person does not 
reside in the country of insurance the benefits in kind will be provided according to the 
legislation of the country of residence but reimbursed by the competent institution in the 
country of insurance. 
 
The case of invalidity benefits is more complicated and might even under the European 
portability scheme lead to disadvantageous situations for migrants. This is especially due to 
differences in the importance of length of insurance periods: In some countries the length of 
insurance period is taken into account and in others entitlements are independent from length 
of insurance periods. Usually in the latter a person’s entitlement depends on whether s/he was 
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insured at the moment when the invalidity occurs while in the first type of countries a person 
is still entitled to benefits even if not insured anymore with the correspondent system. 
 
This fact makes coordination in the area of invalidity benefits a difficult task and leads 
basically to four scenarios: If a person has been insured in several countries the European 
portability scheme provides different solutions for cases in which the amount of pension 
depends on the length of the insurance period and cases in which the amount does not depend 
on the length of the insurance period. If a person has been insured exclusively in countries 
where the amount depends on the length of insurance periods, s/he will receive separate 
pensions from each of these states. The corresponding amounts are equally calculated as the 
amount of pensions a person receives from each country s/he was insured in (see above). If a 
person was insured only in countries where the amount of pension is independent of the 
length of insurance periods the person will receive an invalidity pension from the state s/he 
was insured with last. The person is entitled to the full amount of pension even if insured just 
a short time period. There are no entitlements to benefits from other countries the person was 
insured with. Thus a person might receive a relatively low invalidity pension according to the 
country of last insurance even if s/he has been insured for a long time period in a country with 
rather generous invalidity pensions. 
 
Following this logic there are two more relevant cases: A person was first insured in a country 
where the amount of invalidity pension depends on the length of insurance periods and then in 
a country where it does not. This person will receive two pensions: One from the first state 
corresponding to the insured time period and one from the second state where s/he became 
invalid. Normally the second state will pay a reduced pension taking into account payments 
from the first state. The fourth and last case applies to a person first insured in a country 
where the amount of invalidity pension does not depend on the length of insurance periods 
and then in a country where it does. Here the person again will receive two separate pensions 
corresponding to the length of insurance periods in the corresponding country. 
 
The determination of the degree of invalidity is still a controversial issue. Normally, each 
national insurance institution decides this according to national legislation. But in some cases 
the decisions of one institution might be binding to the institution of another member state. 
Here the difference between harmonizing the national social security schemes and merely 
coordinating them becomes obvious. Nevertheless, benefits from invalidity schemes are paid 
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regardless of where a person stays inside of the European Economic Area. (see Europäische 
Kommission - Beschäftigung und Soziale Angelegenheiten 1999: p. 18-27) 
 
5. A Framework to analyse the effects of the European portability and coordination 
regime 
 
The free movement of labour has always been a centrepiece of the process of European 
unification. Whenever workers or other EEA citizens migrated to other member states 
problems of portability and/or coordination of social security claims between involved 
countries emerged. As labour mobility increased, fostered by more and more liberal 
arrangements between the member states, demand for coordination of the involved social 
security schemes increased as well. Since the implementation of the Single European Market 
the European portability scheme made great improvements and many steps forward. But as a 
general rule, social policy always lagged behind economic policy and solutions tended to be 
found after they had caused trouble for quite a while. The European portability scheme was 
not an effort to foster developments towards a European social policy, it was merely meant to 
support economic policy. This explains why the development of the current European 
portability scheme was not accompanied by an analysis of its macroeconomic effects on the 
national social security systems. There has merely been a discussion about possible effects. A 
reason for this reluctance to think about the impact the European portability scheme has on 
national social security systems may also be found in the still small numbers of intra-EEA 
migrants. 
 
The paper at hand proposes a framework which may serve as a basis for further studies of 
macroeconomic effects of the European portability scheme on national social security 
schemes. For this purpose I will elaborate a categorization of involved persons. The categories 
go along with different effects the European portability scheme may have upon the national 
social security schemes. 
 
Basically there are two main groups of persons whose migration has very different effects: 
Persons that integrate into the national security system of the country they have migrated to 
and persons who migrate but stay insured with the country they came from. According to the 
European portability scheme, the first group is made up of all active persons and their families 
excluding frontier and posted workers. The second group is made up of frontier and posted 
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workers as well as all inactive persons like pensioners, survivors, students and unemployed 
migrants and their families. 
 
Table 1. Formation of “Integrators” and “Non-Integrators” 
 Migrants that integrate into the 
social security system of the “new” 
country 
Migrants that stay insured in the 
“old” country 
Active persons Employed, civil servants and self-
employed 
Posted and Frontier workers 
Non-active 
persons 
 Pensioners, students, survivors, 
unemployed 
Family members Family members of the above 
mentioned persons (only non-active 
family members?) 
Family members of the above 
mentioned persons (only non-
active family members?) 
Source: Author 
 
Why do these two groups of persons cause different effects? The categorization goes along 
with whether or not a person is residing in the country of insurance. Migrants that integrate 
into the social security system of the “new” country pay their contributions and receive 
benefits from the same country. The other group of migrants that does not integrate but stays 
insured with the “old” country, pays contributions to and receives benefits from the “old” 
country. 
 
(A) “Non-Integrators”: Persons residing in one member state being insured in another 
When benefits in kind are provided in the “new” country they will be refunded from within 
the system of the “old” country. In this case, where the country of insurance differs from the 
country of residence payments are made by one country according to the legislation of 
another country. This will invoke macro and micro level effects. On the macro level 
depending on the price-level in the “new” country higher or lower costs will be observed. On 
the micro level the utility of the migrant will be lower or higher depending on the quality level 
of benefits in kind provided in the “new” country (see Rothgang 1998: p. 234-243).  
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(B) “Integrators”: Persons that migrate to another EEA state and integrate into the “new” 
social security system 
This group of persons may seem unproblematic concerning possible macro effects at first. 
They pay contributions to the same member state they receive benefits from. Different to 
group (A) they receive the whole set of benefits from the country of residence ranging from 
benefits in kind to cash benefits. At a second look one realises that this group depending on 
the point in their life they migrate may have severe impact on the system of social security of 
the “new” country. If they migrate at an advance stage of their working life, they have paid 
contributions for many years in their “old” country. If one assumes, that with age the costs for 
medical care for a person rises, than it can also be assumed that the “new” country will face 
costs without having all the payment from the earlier years from that person. 
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